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Abstract 
Trade in financial services is integrated through Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs), in addition 
to the multilateral trading system developed under the WTO. Securities’ clearing and settlement services 
have nowadays become more important than ever. The latter have gained enormous strategic relevance 
due to the global regulatory shift towards tasking clearinghouses to mitigate the risks associated with 
trading of OTC derivatives. This study assesses the liberalization levels of the financial services in the 
plurilateral trading system. It aims to shed light on the underlying dynamics that could explain the 
rationale behind international trade treaties. Most importantly, this contribution assesses the relationship 
between regulation of international trade and regulation of financial market infrastructure in order to 
bring into the spotlight problematic features that underscore existing silos in WTO Members’ 
administrations. 
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I. Introduction* 
One of the most contentious issues of the ongoing Brexit negotiations is the treatment of clearinghouses 
once the UK is out of the European single market. UK's departure gives rise to problems relating to the 
supervision of clearinghouses for euro-denominated products. Additionally, clearinghouses are major 
profit generators for financial venues and that is why Frankfurt intensifies its attempts in attracting 
London's business.1 Ultimately, the relationship that the EU and the UK will strike will define the 
relationship of their financial institutions. The scenario that seems more likely today would envisage an 
economic integration agreement similar to CETA. Understanding how financial services liberalization 
works in trade agreements is crucial to gain a broader perspective of the international supply of financial 
services. Financial markets are so interconnected that regulation of one state fundamentally impacts on 
other jurisdictions. This explains the US involvement and strong advocacy as regards the Brexit plans 
of clearinghouses.2 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the US derivatives regulator, opposes 
the current plans because market disruptions could emerge and even threats to ban European banks from 
US financial market infrastructure. Thus, the regional integration of financial services is crucial for the 
operation of financial market infrastructure. Shedding light on the liberalization of regionalism and 
explaining its elements are this study's purpose 
In particular, this paper aims to (i) map out how financial services’ regionalism, illustrated by 
Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs),3 compares and contrasts with the liberalization of financial 
services at the multilateral trading system, and to (ii) investigate the role of national financial regulations 
in that context. The increasing importance of regionalism in international trade, while multilateral 
negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) have stalemate effects, makes this exercise 
highly relevant.4. One of the EIAs’ objectives is to decrease or eliminate the barriers to trade in services 
and investment among their Members. This study assesses the liberalization depth of financial 
securities’ clearing and settlement services in EIAs. To that end, I evaluate how the regulation of 
international trade contributes to the integration of financial services, on the one hand, and explore the 
transnational dynamics and trends that explain the integration of the service’s sector in question, on the 
other. The recent proliferation of concluded EIAs on trade in services underscores their importance for 
international trade and policy, and at the same time brings into the spotlight the need for a better 
understanding of the plurilateral trading system’s ramifications in the liberalization of services. 
Carrying out this exercise is crucial to delineate the relationship between trade in services under 
disparate legal orders, namely, under the WTO and under EIAs. The mechanics and asymmetric 
architecture of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)5 have been examined thoroughly 
                                                     
* I want to express my gratitude to Petros C. Mavroidis, Bernard Hoekman, Carlo Maria Cantore, Adam Jakubik, and Ioannis 
Galariotis for their valueable comments to previous drafts and discussions. All errors remain my own. 
1 See Financial Times, Philipp Stafford https://www.ft.com/content/abc6d4e4-93f1-11e8-b67b-b8205561c3fe . 
2 See Financial Times, Philip Stafford https://www.ft.com/content/f9ba5588-d21a-11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5. 
3 This paper has opted for using the term EIA, as employed in Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), because securities’ clearing and settlement services are embedded in international trade agreements regulating 
trade in services. However, the terms Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) or Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) can be 
used interchangeably since they refer to the same type of agreements. 
4 See for example Crawford J. and Fiorentino R. (2005), “The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements”, WTO 
Discussion Paper 8; Roy M., Marchetti J. and Hoe Lim A. (September 2006), “Services Liberalization in the New 
Generation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): How Much Further than the GATS?”, WTO Economic Research 
and Statistics Division, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-07; The World Bank (2005), Global Economic Prospects: Trade, 
Regionalism and Development report. 
5 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, done at 
Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, UNTS No. 31874. The text is available in: WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2017), at 357. 
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by literature. However, it is worth highlighting that the liberalization of trade in services is principally 
contingent on WTO Members’ GATS commitments under Articles XVI, and XVII on market access, 
and national treatment, respectively.6 The research question of this paper is not concerned with the 
GATS levels of liberalization per se, but rather the liberalization depth in EIAs. In that endeavor, the 
WTO Members’ commitments under the GATS are used as the benchmark to measure how much 
beyond them the undertaken commitments in EIAs extend. The methodology of this study is developed 
in detail in the next section. The forthcoming paragraphs summarize the importance of clearing and 
settlement services for the integrity of financial systems, and their regulatory evolution as of today. 
Financial instruments’ clearing and settlement services have been regulated by international trade 
for the first time in late nineties, when the GATS Annex in Financial Services entered into force.7 Since 
then, a lot has changed in terms of the services prominence in world economies’ financial market 
infrastructure. In particular, the industry itself has been subject to numerous changes driven by the force 
of regulation across the globe. Regardless of the economic model followed by WTO Members and the 
underlying competition structures of clearing and settlement service suppliers, whether monopolistic, or 
oligopolistic, the interconnectedness of international finance cannot permit major operational 
discrepancies that can result in financial market disruptions, and potentially place the whole system’s 
financial stability into jeopardy. Importantly, clearing and settlement services are traditionally tasked 
with addressing the risks associated with the trading of financial instruments, such as the failure of a 
counterparty to fulfill its part of the deal in a derivatives transaction or even the “loss” of a security due 
to its high exchangeability, being the “back-office” activity of trading securities.8 That said, clearing 
and settlement services have been part of the financial markets since late nineteenth century,9 but their 
relevance today has been shaped due to the regulatory swift responding to the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, and in accordance with the G-20 mandate, financial regulations that 
place the functioning of clearinghouses in the epicenter of over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets 
were crafted. The new role attributed to clearinghouses pertains to requiring the mandatory clearing of 
certain types of OTC derivatives,10 that can potentially have a systemic spillover effect in case one of 
the counterparties to the transaction goes bust.11 This regulatory change aspires to reduce the perils posed 
by derivative markets, while taking into consideration that additional costs levied to trading parties, by 
the posting of collateral. This regulatory trend is in sharp contrast to what used to occur, where financial 
institutions were free to choose whether they wanted to employ clearing services or proceed the 
transaction without. Accordingly, the whole business of clearing has developed since then, and 
interestingly, this study seeks to investigate if this regulatory swift has impinged on the liberalization of 
clearing services, traced in EIAs. The GATS commitments on clearing services are ubiquitous in the 
multilateral trading system. Nonetheless, they are not apt to capture regulatory evolution because they 
                                                     
6 WTO Members voluntarily enter commitments on market access (Article XVI), national treatment (XVII), and additional 
commitments (XVIII) in their GATS Schedules, which constitute treaty text, on the basis of their national preferences. 
Liberalization is attained in the multilateral trading system in accordance to these specific commitments. As long as WTO 
Members decide to open more services sectors to international competition from other WTO Members, more liberalization 
is achieved. Accordingly, there is a positive relation between the process of entering commitments and the liberalization of 
services. 
7 The GATS Annex on Financial Services explicitly refers in its indicative list to clearing services in par. 5(a)(xiv): settlement 
and clearing services for financial assets, including securities, derivative products, and other negotiable instruments. 
8 For general literature on financial instruments clearing and settlement services in the European Union see D. Turing, 
Clearing and Settlement, 2017, Bloomsbury. 
9 For a historical narrative of clearinghouses see Neal L. Wolkoff and Jason B. Werner, “History of Regulation of Clearing 
in the Securities and Futures Markets, and Its Impact on Competition, The,” Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 30 (2010): 313. 
10 Such as interest rate swaps, foreign exchange, and credit default swaps among others. 
11 This regulatory trend can be identified in all major global economies, and its efficacy on the basis of the G-20 standards is 
measured by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) annually. 
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are not updated by WTO Members. This paper seeks to identify whether EIAs are better placed to 
encounter these regulatory challenges. 
Investigating the commitments undertaken by WTO Members for clearing and settlement services 
in EIAs, leads to measuring the depth of their liberalization, while aiming to take a grasp of the 
underlying dynamics that are the driving forces of the observed integration model. What are the 
geographical trends that contribute to the liberalization of international clearing trade-flows, or, what 
type of restrictions in the integration of these services are placed in EIAs are some of the questions to 
be addressed. This paper is structured as follows: Section II, sets out the methodology of the study. 
Section III, sheds light on the descriptive statistics and observations drawn by the study to deploy a 
comprehensive analysis of the stakes involved. Section IV, adopts a line of argument with regards to the 
relationship between the regulation of financial services and the law of international trade based on the 
findings of the paper. Finally, Section V concludes. 
II. Methodology 
One of the overarching objectives of this contribution is to establish a comprehensive typology of the 
commitments pertinent to clearing and settlement services in EIAs. Our analysis covers the 152 EIAs 
currently in force,12 which have been notified to the WTO up to September 2018 under Article V 
(Economic Integration) of the GATS, under Article XXIV (Territorial Application – Frontier Traffic – 
Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT-1994), 
and the Enabling Clause (Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation on Developing Countries). The scope of this paper is limited to the agreements that 
the level of their integration utilizes the trade liberalizing toolkit provided by the GATS. Namely, deeply 
integrated economic unions are not examined because their inclusion would not add any value, as the 
tools employed to further integrate these markets (i) deviate from the traditional trade instruments and 
as a result cannot serve the purposes of this empirical study because they are not comparable, and (ii) 
represent a small fraction (12/152) of the number of agreements notified to the WTO.13 The two main 
set of documents that this analysis is premised on are undoubtedly the schedules of commitments, and 
the list of reservations of the parties to the EIAs, which are usually in the form of annexes attached to 
the main agreement. Nonetheless, in numerous occasions recourse to the agreements’ chapters and side 
documents, such as protocols, communication letters, understandings, and other documents associated 
with the EIAs is necessary to obtain a holistic perspective of this study’s subject matter.  
Henceforth, since the nature of this inquiry is to measure the liberalization of clearing and settlement 
services in EIAs, it is essential to clarify the tools that are employed to that end. Traditionally, trade in 
services is supplied through the GATS four (4) modes of supply: namely, cross-border supply (mode 1), 
consumption abroad (mode 2), commercial presence (mode 3), and movement of persons (mode 4).14 
                                                     
12 The WTO Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) database has been used as main source to collect the data of this study. All 
EIAs that are reviewed here, alongside with the text of the agreements, the annexes and other related documents can be 
found in the linked database, https://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx. 
13 The 12 EIAs notified to the WTO that are not covered by this study are the following: EC (15) Enlargement, EC (25) 
Enlargement, EC (27) Enlargement, EC Treaty, EU (28) Enlargement, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU) – Accession of Armenia, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – Accession of Kyrgyz Republic, 
European Economic Area (EEA), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), 
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). 
14 It is well-documented that the evolution of technological means that financial services are supplied transnationally has 
created a legal problem in the interpretation of undertaken commitments for modes 1 (cross-border supply) and 2 
(consumption abroad), either under the multilateral trading system, through the GATS schedules, or under EIAs. For 
analyses on this issue, and the possible problematic implications see WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Committee on 
Trade in Financial Services, S/C/W/312, S/FIN/W/73, 3 February 2010, par. 36, p. 10; Judson O. Berkley, A Framework 
Agreement for Electronic Commerce Regulation under the GATS, 1-2 (Institute for International Finance, 2001); George 
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When it comes to wholesale financial services, such as the ones of clearing and settlement, immediately 
mode 4 becomes redundant, because these types of services are provided by large financial institutions, 
rather than by individuals. Therefore, this study examines the liberalization of clearing and settlement 
services for modes 1, 2, and 3. Furthermore, same as in the multilateral trading system, in EIAs the 
liberalization of financial services is effectuated through undertaken commitments on market access, 
and national treatment, which are contingent upon specific mode of supply. Thus, the modes of supply 
and the entered commitments on market access and national treatment are the existing variables that 
define the level of liberalization of clearing and settlement services in EIAs. 
For the sake of clarity, it shall be underlined that while evaluating the level of liberalization of 
clearing and settlement services in EIAs on the basis of the abovementioned landmarks (modes of 
supply, and commitments), challenges emerge due to the different approach that countries adopt in 
scheduling their commitments.15 Namely, the three more frequently met methods are: on the one hand 
(i) positive lists, which mirror the scheduling approach put forward in the GATS. In specific, countries 
in their schedules of commitments include all the services sectors and subsectors, and attached to them 
they inscribe whether they undertake particular commitments for market access and national treatment 
for the particular modes of supply; on the other hand (ii) negative lists follow the approach used for the 
first time in North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The negative list approach instead of 
schedules of commitments, has list of reservations which strictly refer to the measures that are not 
subject to full commitment (complete liberalization). Thirdly, (iii) hybrid lists have emerged as a model 
that combines characteristics of the two latter. For instance, hybrid lists use positive list for cross-border 
supply and negative lists for establishment. Traditionally, negative listing is closer than its positive 
counterpart to the objective of trade liberalization because it forces states to scrutinize their regulatory 
frameworks and check its compatibility with trade disciplines, before concluding their trade agreements, 
where they have to include these measures in their list of reservations in concreto. The challenges met 
in the process of collecting the empirics of this study lie with the inherent differences of the two 
approaches. To produce a comprehensive dataset that measures the level of liberalization of EIAs it is 
necessary to first compile and structure the data in a uniform fashion. To that end, in the process of 
compiling the data from EIAs with negative lists, I translated them into positive commitments so that 
the contribution can be more thorough and provide for a clearer picture of the overall EIA’s status quo. 
The question that next comes to mind relates to the methodology adopted to gauge the “depth” of the 
just-described liberalization. For starters, WTO Members have undertaken commitments in their GATS 
schedules for clearing and settlement services. These commitments naturally mirror the GATS 
asymmetric geometry, and are different for each and every WTO Member. Notably, this chapter 
investigates for the first time the clearing and settlement services’ commitments of parties to EIAs. Once 
the commitments of EIA parties are mapped out, they are juxtaposed to the ones entered by the same 
countries in their GATS schedules. The outcome of the juxtaposition between the countries’ 
commitments in EIAs, and their commitments under the GATS defines the liberalization depth. More 
specifically, there are 4 possible scenarios in that score: first, if country’s x undertaken commitments in 
a EIA fall below the GATS threshold, then this is a GATS-minus. However, due to the existence of the 
GATS Article II on MFN, this category constitutes nothing but a legal fiction; second, if country x has 
entered in a EIA the exact same commitments, as the ones under the GATS, then we have a GATS 
liberalization depth; third, if the commitments of country x in a EIA go beyond the ones in the GATS, 
                                                     
A. Papaconstantinou, No GATS No Glory: The EU Regulation of Clearinghouses and WTO Law, EUI Law Working Paper 
5/2018, p. 16-18. 
15 For thorough analyses with regards to the different approaches that parties to EIA use to opening their services sectors see 
Roy, M., J. Marchetti, and H. Lim, 2008. “The Race Towards Preferential Trade Agreements in Services: How Much is 
Really Achieved?,” in Panizzon, Pohl, and Sauve, (eds.), The GATS and International Regulation of Trade in Services. 
New York: Cambridge University Press; Cf Juan A. Marchetti, 2011. “Do PTAs Actually Increase Parties’ Services 
Trade?”, in Bagwell, and Mavroidis (eds.), Preferential Trade Agreements: A Law and Economics Analysis. Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 214-220.  
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then this constitutes a GATS-plus; forth, if country x has not undertaken any commitments in the GATS, 
but it does in the context of the EIA, then this scenario is termed as GATS-extra. For the purposes of 
some figures and tables, third and fourth categories are merged under the following character, GATS(+). 
This contribution aims first to empirically assess the liberalization levels of clearing and settlement 
services in EIAs, and second to explore the underlying dynamics and trends that spearhead the surveyed 
liberalization. For instance, an essential query that this study seeks to address relates to which 
geographical regions put forward the liberalization agenda for these financial market infrastructure 
services and if possible, interpret the reasons behind. The recent history of the GATS has taught us that 
it was the US, and its industry, alongside with the European Communities, at the time, that aspired and 
managed to introduce an international rulebook for the trade in financial services.16 Has something 
changed in the course of the next two decades, or are the same regions the net exporters of financial 
services? The case study of clearing and settlement services is going to be a helpful guide in this respect. 
Next, other trends in terms of the specific services sector are discerned based on the empirics, such as 
the negative or positive listing and which is more prone to furnish liberalization. Additionally, new 
regulatory frameworks for clearinghouses across the globe, in the aftermath of the crisis, started being 
enacted around 2010. How does this regulatory trend blend in the liberalization of clearing services in 
EIAs? This study will try to give an answer to that as well.  
After having contextualized the features of this paper and explained the methodological steps that 
the analysis undertakes, it is time to venture into the empirics of this study in order to engage in the 
subject matter and put forward the arguments of this contribution. First, the scope of the study becomes 
evident and furthermore, the trends that have been identified in the EIAs’ commitments on clearing and 
settlement services are discussed. 
III. Empirical analysis 
1. Findings 
Before delving into the more granular aspects of this paper, it is essential to introduce its precise scope, 
and its main features. To start with, as mentioned above, this study covers the EIAs, included in Table 
1, which regulate securities’ clearing and settlement services, and at least one party has made 
commitments.17 Additionally, the timeframes of their conclusions are comprised in the next two columns 
so that the chronological trends in terms of the scheduling approaches (either through positive, negative 
or hybrid lists), and liberalization levels that exceed the GATS state of play can be initially drawn, before 
we further shed light on them in the course of the analysis. Out of the 102 EIAs, 49 use schedules of 
commitments (positive lists) and 48 lists of reservations (negative lists), while 3 are hybrids. The fifth 
column observes whether at least one party to the EIA in question enters commitments on clearing and 
settlement services that are more trade liberalizing than the ones it has undertaken in the multilateral 
trading system, under the GATS. Interestingly, 64 EIAs extend higher commitments than the ones under 
the GATS regime. The specifics of this table are examined infra. 
  
                                                     
16 Admittedly, it was American Express that put forward the agenda of incorporating financial services under the negotiations 
of the WTO. For analyses on the dynamics that led to the inclusion of financial services in the GATS, see J. A. Marchetti 
and P. C. Mavroidis, “The Genesis of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services),” European Journal of 
International Law 22, no. 3 (August 1, 2011): 689–721. Cf. Key, Sydney J. The Doha Round and financial services 
negotiations. American Enterprise Institute, 2003. 
17 In subsection 3 infra, the 38 preferential trade agreements that either do not regulate trade in financial services or do not 
furnish specific set of commitments for clearing and settlement services are examined. Particular behavioral patterns and 
geographical trends are discerned.. 
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Table 1: EIAs under review 
 
EIA 
Entry into 
force 
WTO 
notification 
Positive or 
Negative list? 
EIA's commitments on 
clearing & settlement 
going beyond the 
GATS? 
ASEAN - Australia - 
New Zealand Jan. 2010 Apr. 2010 Positive list No 
ASEAN - China Jul. 2007 Jun. 2008 Positive list No 
ASEAN - India Jul. 2015 Aug. 2015 Positive list No 
ASEAN - Korea, 
Republic of Oct. 2010 Jul. 2010 Positive list No 
Australia - Chile Mar. 2009 Mar. 2009 Negative list Yes 
Australia - China Dec. 2015 Jan. 2016 Negative list Yes 
Australia - New Zealand Jan. 1989 Nov. 1995 Negative list Yes 
Brunei Darussalam - 
Japan Jul. 2008 Jul. 2008 Positive list Yes 
Canada - Colombia Aug. 2011 Oct. 2011 Negative list Yes 
Canada - Honduras Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Negative list Yes 
Canada - Panama Apr. 2013 Apr. 2013 Negative list Yes 
Canada - Peru Aug. 2009 Jul. 2009 Negative list Yes 
Canada - Rep. of Korea Jan. 2015 Jan. 2015 Negative list Yes 
Chile - Japan Sep. 2007 Aug. 2007 Positive list Yes 
Chile - Thailand Nov. 2015 Sep. 2017 Positive list Yes 
China - Georgia Jan. 2018 Apr. 2018 Positive list Yes 
China - Korea, Republic 
of Dec. 2015 Mar. 2016 Positive list No 
China - New Zealand Oct. 2008 Apr. 2009 Positive list No 
China - Singapore Jan. 2009 Mar. 2009 Positive list No 
Costa Rica - Colombia Aug. 2016 Oct. 2016 Negative list Yes 
Dominican Republic - 
Central America - 
United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-
DR) Mar. 2006 Mar. 2006 Negative list Yes 
EFTA - Central America 
(Costa Rica and 
Panama) Aug. 2014 Nov. 2014 Positive list Yes 
EFTA - Colombia Jul. 2011 Sep. 2011 Positive list Yes 
EFTA-Georgia Sep. 2017 Aug. 2017 Positive list Yes 
EFTA - Hong Kong, 
China Oct. 2012 Sep. 2012 Negative list Yes 
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EFTA - Korea, Republic 
of Sep. 2006 Aug. 2006 Positive list Yes 
EFTA - Mexico Jul. 2001 Jul. 2001 Negative list Yes 
EFTA - Singapore Jan. 2003 Jan. 2003 Positive list No 
EFTA-Ukraine Jun. 2012 Jun. 2012 Positive list Yes 
EU - Canada Sep. 2017 Sep. 2017 Negative list No 
EU - CARIFORUM Dec. 2008 Oct. 2008 Positive/Negative No 
EU - Central America Aug. 2013 Feb. 2013 Negative list Yes 
EU - Chile Mar. 2005 Oct. 2005 Positive list Yes 
EU - Colombia and Peru Mar. 2013 Feb. 2013 Negative list Yes 
EU - Colombia, Peru - 
Accession of Equador Jan. 2017 Mar. 2017 Positive/Negative Yes 
EU - Georgia Sep. 2014 Jul. 2014 Hybrid No 
EU - Korea, Republic of Jul. 2011 Jul. 2011 Positive list No 
EU - Mexico Oct. 2002 Jun. 2002 Negative list Yes 
EU - Moldova, Republic 
of Sep. 2014 Jun. 2014 Hybrid No 
EU - Ukraine Apr. 2014 Jul. 2014 Hybrid No 
Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) - 
Singapore Sep. 2013 Jun. 2015 Positive list Yes 
Hong Kong, China - 
Chile Oct. 2014 Oct. 2014 Positive list Yes 
Hong Kong, China - 
Macao, China Oct. 2017 Dec. 2017 Positive list No 
Hong Kong, China - 
New Zealand Jan. 2011 Jan. 2011 Negative list No 
Iceland-China Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014 Positive list No 
India - Japan Aug. 2011 Sep. 2011 Positive list Yes 
India - Malaysia Jul. 2011 Sep. 2011 Positive list No 
India - Singapore Aug. 2005 May-07 Positive list No 
Japan - Australia Jan. 2015 Jan. 2015 Negative list Yes 
Japan - Indonesia Jul. 2008 Jun. 2008 Positive list Yes 
Japan - Malaysia Jul. 2006 Jul. 2006 Positive list Yes 
Japan-Mexico Apr. 2005 Mar. 2005 Negative list No 
Japan - Mongolia Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 Positive list No 
Japan - Peru Mar. 2012 Feb. 2012 Negative list Yes 
Japan - Philippines Dec. 2008 Dec. 2008 Positive list Yes 
Japan - Singapore Nov. 2002 Nov. 2002 Positive list No 
Japan - Switzerland Sep. 2009 Sep. 2009 Negative list Yes 
Japan - Thailand Nov. 2007 Oct. 2007 Positive list Yes 
Japan - Viet Nam Oct. 2009 Oct. 2009 Positive list Yes 
George A. Papaconstantinou 
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Jordan - Singapore Aug. 2005 Jul. 2006 Positive list No 
Korea, Republic of - 
Australia Dec. 2014 Dec. 2014 Negative list Yes 
Korea, Republic of - 
India Jan. 2010 Jul. 2010 Positive list No 
Korea, Republic of - 
Singapore Mar. 2006 Feb. 2006 Positive list No 
Korea, Republic of - US Mar. 2012 Mar. 2012 Negative list Yes 
Korea, Republic of - 
Viet Nam Dec. 2015 Mar. 2016 Positive list No 
Malaysia - Australia Jan. 2013 May. 2013 Positive list No 
Mexico - Panama Jul. 2015 Jun. 2016 Negative list Yes 
New Zealand - Chinese 
Taipei Dec. 2013 Nov. 2013 Negative list Yes 
New Zealand - Malaysia Aug. 2010 Feb. 2012 Positive list No 
New Zealand - 
Singapore Jan. 2001 Sep. 2001 Positive list No 
Nicaragua - Chinese 
Taipei Jan. 2008 Jul. 2009 Negative list Yes 
North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) Jan. 1994 Mar. 1995 Negative list Yes 
Pacific -Alliance May-16 Nov. 2016 Negative list Yes 
Pakistan - China Oct. 2009 May. 2010 Positive list No 
Pakistan - Malaysia Jan. 2008 Feb. 2008 Positive list No 
Panama - Chinese Taipei Jan. 2004 Jul. 2009 Negative list Yes 
Panama - Costa Rica 
(Panama - Central 
America) Nov. 2008 Apr. 2009 Negative list Yes 
Panama - El Salvador 
(Panama - Central 
America) Apr. 2003 Feb. 2005 Negative list Yes 
Panama - Guatemala 
(Panama - Central 
America) Jun. 2009 Apr. 2013 Negative list Yes 
Panama - Honduras 
(Panama - Central 
America ) Jan. 2009 Dec. 2009 Negative list Yes 
Panama - Nicaragua 
(Panama - Central 
America) Nov. 2009 Feb. 2013 Negative list Yes 
Panama-Peru May. 2012 Apr. 2012 Negative list Yes 
Panama - Singapore Jul. 2006 Apr. 2007 Negative list Yes 
Peru - China Mar. 2010 Mar. 2010 Positive list Yes 
Trade in Financial Services Regionalism: Derivatives Clearing and Settlement in Economic Integration Agreements 
European University Institute 9 
Peru - Korea, Republic 
of Aug. 2011 Aug. 2011 Negative list Yes 
Peru - Mexico Feb. 2012 Feb. 2012 Negative list Yes 
Peru - Singapore Aug. 2009 Jul. 2009 Positive list No 
Singapore - Australia Jul. 2003 Sep. 2003 Negative list Yes 
Singapore - Chinese 
Taipei Apr. 2014 Apr. 2014 Positive list No 
Switzerland - China Jul. 2014 Jun. 2014 Positive list No 
Thailand - Australia Jan. 2005 Dec. 2004 Positive list Yes 
Ukraine - Montenegro Jan. 2013 Apr. 2013 Positive list No 
US - Australia Jan. 2005 Dec. 2004 Negative list Yes 
US - Bahrain Aug. 2006 Sep. 2006 Negative list Yes 
US - Chile Jan. 2004 Dec. 2003 Negative list Yes 
US - Colombia May. 2012 May. 2012 Negative list Yes 
US - Jordan Dec. 2001 Jan. 2002 Positive list No 
US - Morocco Jan. 2006 Dec. 2005 Negative list Yes 
US - Oman Jan. 2009 Jan. 2009 Negative list No 
US - Panama Oct. 2012 Oct. 2012 Negative list Yes 
US - Peru Feb. 2009 Feb. 2009 Negative list Yes 
US-Singapore Jan. 2004 Dec. 2003 Negative list No 
Source: Own analysis, WTO RTA database 
2. Comments on EIAs commitments: stability and competition considerations 
This subsection investigates the comments that parties to EIAs have attached to their commitments on 
financial instruments’ clearing and settlement services. The importance of this exercise principally lies 
in discovering different countries perceptions/intentions over the underlying services on the one hand, 
and discerning potential trends on the other. Regardless the major differences between the two financial 
market infrastructure services sectors, due to their CPC classification they are always examined hand in 
hand in all plurilateral trade agreements, same as in the GATS. Nonetheless, such categorization posits 
complexity to trade negotiators charged with bargaining over trade in financial services issues because 
it links two significantly different industries under the same roof. We contend that the silo that exists 
between the trade and finance teams of most countries administrations is to blame for the lack of 
convergence of the two disciplines. This dichotomy between trade and finance administrations is 
exemplified strikingly by the content of PTAs, whereby no reflections of the financial industry’s 
evolution in terms of commitments or specific provisions are recorded. Below, Table 2 sheds light on 
the comments pertinent to the subject matter of the study and later we discuss the way these comments 
explain the state of play of international clearing and settlement trade-flows, as at the same time we 
attempt to interpret the relation between trade commitments and international finance. 
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Table 2: EIA comments on commitments in clearing and settlement services 
 
Country 
EIA comments on commitments limiting liberalization in 
Clearing & Settlement services 
In EIAs with 
Singapore 
Market Access & National Treatment: (Mode 1): Unbound, 
except for the provision of settlement and clearing services for 
financial assets which are listed on overseas exchanges only. 
(Mode 3): These measures are also limitations on national 
treatment. Settlement and clearing services for exchange traded 
securities and financial futures can only be provided by Central 
Depository (Pte) Limited and Singapore Exchange Derivatives 
Clearing Ltd (SGX-DT) respectively.Only one clearing house 
established under the Banking Act may provide clearing 
services for Singapore dollar cheques and interbank fund 
transfer. 
AESEAN-Australia-
New Zealand, 
AESEAN-China, 
AESEAN-India, 
AESEAN-Korea, 
China, EFTA, GCC, 
India, Japan, Jordan, 
Korea, New-
Zealand, Panama, 
Peru, Chinese 
Taipei and US 
Singapore 
Market Access Reservation: Singapore reserves the right to 
adopt or maintain any measure affecting the supply of clearing 
and settlement services for exchange traded securities, financial 
futures and interbank transfers. | National Treatment & Market 
Access Reservation: Singapore reserves the right to adopt or 
maintain any measure in the form of subsidies or grants 
provided by Singapore in connection with the supply of any 
financial service involving what Singapore deems as 
systemically important financial markets infrastructure, 
including: (a) Exchanges; (b) Central Depositories; (c) 
Repositories; (d) Clearing and Settlement facilities; and (e) 
Market operators. Australia 
Cambodia 
Market Access: (Mode 3): Unbound until the Government of 
Cambodia determines what types of entities can conduct these 
services, the related laws and regulation are established, and 
such business is authorized by the government or other relevant 
designated authority. 
AESEAN-India and 
AESEAN-Korea 
Jordan 
Market Access: (Mode 3): Access restricted to the Depository 
Center at the Amman Bourse for securities, and to the Central 
Bank of Jordan for all other financial instruments. Singapore and US 
Montenegro 
Market Access: (Mode 3): This type of services may be 
provided by Central Depository of Securities only Ukraine 
Bahrain 
Market Access: (Mode 1): Unbound, except for cross-listed 
equities that may be cleared on exchanges offering reciprocal 
privileges and that meet Bahrain information requirements. 
(Mode 3): Unbound. Bahraini Dinar (BD) clearing must be 
through the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB). BSE listed 
equities & securities must be cleared through the BSE. GCC-Singapore 
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Saudi Arabia 
Market Access & National Treatment: (Modes 2 and 3): 
Unbound for all domestic settlement and clearing services 
provided exclusively by Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) under 'j.' This also limits national treatment. GCC-Singapore 
Romania 
Market Access: (Mode 1) Unbound for financial leasing, for 
trading of money market instruments, foreign exchange, 
derivative products, exchange rate and interest rate instruments, 
transferable securities and other negotiable instruments and 
financial assets, for participation in issues of all kinds of 
securities, for asset management and for settlement and 
clearing services for financial assets. Payments and money 
transmission services are allowed only through a resident bank.  
EU-Ukraine, EU-
Moldova, EU-
Korea, EU-Georgia, 
EU-Colombia-Peru-
Ecuador, EU-
Colombia-Peru, EU-
Central America 
and EU-
CARIFORUM 
Croatia 
Market Access: (Mode 3) None, except for settlement and 
clearing services where the Central Depositary Agency (CDA) 
is the sole supplier in Croatia. Access to the services of the 
CDA will be granted to non-residents on a non-discriminatory 
basis. 
EU-Ukraine and 
EU-Colombia-Peru-
Ecuador 
Italy 
Market Access: (Mode 3): Clearing and settlement of securities 
may be conducted only by the official clearing system. A 
company authorised by the Bank of Italy in agreement with 
Consob could be entrusted with the activity of clearing, up to 
the final settlement of securities. EU-Mexico 
Italy 
Market Access: (Mode 3): Clearing services including the 
phase of final settlement may be conducted only by entities 
duly authorised and supervised by the Bank of Italy in 
agreement with Consob. EU-Chile 
Honduras 
Market Access: (Mode 3): Depositories for the custody, 
compensation and liquidation of shares in Honduras must be 
constituted as public corporations. CAFTA-DR 
Dominican 
Republic 
Market Access: (Mode 3): The following entities must be 
incorporated under the laws of the Dominican Republic: (a) 
stock exchanges, (b) commodities exchanges, (c) brokers, (d) 
dealers, (e) clearing houses, (f) centralized depositories of 
securities, (g) investment fund managers, and (h) securities 
underwriters.  CAFTA-DR 
Chile 
Market Access: (Mode 3): Clearing houses for futures contracts 
and options on securities must be constituted in Chile as 
corporations for that sole purpose and with an authorisation 
from the SVS. They may only be constituted by stock 
exchanges and their stockbrokers. 
Japan, Thailand, 
EU, Hong-Kong and 
Pacific Alliance 
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Chile 
Market Access: (Mode 3): Clearing houses of futures, options 
and other contracts of similar nature that the Superintendencia 
de Valores y Seguros may authorize, must be established as 
special purpose corporations (sociedades anónimas especiales) 
under Chilean law. Only stock exchanges established in Chile 
and stock brokers who are members of those exchanges can be 
shareholders of clearing houses. | Clearing houses of futures 
and options on cattle and agricultural commodities must be 
established as special purpose corporations (sociedades 
anónimas especiales) under Chilean law. Australia and US 
Korea 
Market Access: Only the Korea Securities Depository and the 
Korea Exchange may perform liquidation and settlement of 
securities and derivatives listed or traded on the Korea 
Exchange. Australia and US 
Source: Own analysis, WTO RTA database 
The comments attached to the commitments on financial assets’ clearing and settlement services can 
serve as a good indicator of how the trade negotiating teams of some states understand this sector of 
high relevance for the integrity of international financial systems. In addition, while identifying some 
patterns in the entering commitments process in EIAs, the study indicates that the existing silo between 
financial regulators and trade negotiators does not facilitate their much-needed interaction. Namely, the 
absence of this interaction is at odds with the liberalization of financial services and the promotion of 
international competition. Let us first review the prevalent trends, before we commence the discussion 
on their implications in the transnational regulatory framework. 
First, the common denominator among Singapore, in all the EIAs it has concluded, alongside Korea, 
in its preferential agreements with Australia and the US, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, in their 
commitments under GCC-Singapore, is that they all limit market access of clearing and settlement 
services for domestically listed securities.18 The clear-cut rationale behind this barrier to trade is no other 
than financial stability considerations. Financial stability constitutes an overarching priority for 
regulators. Especially in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, States have ostensibly payed lots 
of attention to restructuring their regulatory architecture in ways that can potentially address perilous 
scenarios. The services provided by clearinghouses for OTC derivatives have been at the forefront of 
financial rulebooks’ revisions, to mitigate the systemic risks involved in these transactions. Nonetheless, 
financial stability considerations are not only met in the context of financial regulatory standards and 
supervisory boards’ list of priorities, but they are additionally encountered in the GATS Annex in 
Financial Services,19 and in most of the concluded EIAs.20 The prudential exemption embedded in trade 
agreements is designed to offer to regulators all the regulatory space they need to address situations of 
emerging financial instability, while filtering whether the corresponding measures’ are fit for the 
purpose, without providing for unnecessary trade barriers. The next paragraph attempts to appraise to 
what extent the limitation met at the abovementioned EIAs’ commitments can be justified under 
                                                     
18 For instance, Korea in its EIA with the US phrases that: only the Korea Securities Depository and the Korea Exchange may 
perform liquidation and settlement of securities and derivatives listed or traded on the Korea Exchange. Or, Singapore for 
the provision of cross-border (mode 1) services always mandates that the services are: unbound except for the provision of 
settlement and clearing services for financial assets which are listed on overseas exchanges only. 
19 For thorough analysis of the role of the GATS prudential carve-out (PCO) in respect of filtering the European Union 
regulatory framework for clearinghouses, see above in Chapter III.  
20 For an empirical approach and a comprehensive analysis of the role of the PCO in EIAs, and its negotiating history in the 
GATS see Carlo Maria Cantore, The Prudential Carve-Out for Financial Services: Rationale and Practice in the GATS 
and Preferential Trade Agreements, Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
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financial stability considerations, while disregarding trade disciplines since States have all the leverage 
while entering their own commitments in services, following the model developed in the GATS era. 
The recent crisis illustrated the interconnectedness of national financial markets, which was 
evidenced in the proliferation effects of securitized financial instruments in derivative markets around 
the world.21 Clearing and settlement are the so-called “back-office” services which are destined to 
support the trading of financial instruments. The whole business of financial market infrastructure is 
international in nature because it mirrors the way financial market transactions occur in parallel to the 
operations of multinational financial institutions. Additionally, it shall be clarified that especially after 
the regulatory overhaul, based on the G-20 mandate, international competition for the clearing of OTC 
derivatives is omnipresent. However, foreign competition of clearing services is contingent upon 
equivalence or substituted compliance regimes,22 which test whether the rules of other States and the 
supervision and enforcement of clearinghouses are on the same page as theirs. Hence, one observation 
that can be made at the outset about the limitation of clearing and settlement of home listed securities 
from foreign entities is that it does not encourage competition in the respective sectors. The conundrum 
in striking the right balance between financial stability and competition in financial services is not yet 
resolved,23 and accordingly there is no established path for States to steer their national regulatory 
policies.  
Additionally, these services sectors have been traditionally subject to monopolistic competition 
structures, and only within the last 20 years competition has started emerging in certain States. Another 
observation to be made is that the countries that decide to have their home listed securities cleared and 
settled within their own jurisdiction do it on the premise that the integrity of their capital markets would 
not be affected by possible malfunction of a foreign financial institution. This rationale seems absolutely 
legitimate and in line with the prudential carve-out provision embedded not only in the GATS, but also 
in most of the EIAs examined here. Nonetheless, financial instruments’ clearing and settlement from 
foreign service suppliers, which currently becomes increasingly relevant does not seem to pose any 
systemic stability problem, as long as the institutions themselves are robust and well managed. The shift 
to international competition on the relevant financial market infrastructure services, such as clearing and 
settlement, is gradual.24 Nonetheless, liberalization in the sector does not seem to pose any risk for the 
integrity of financial markets.25 
Moreover, it is worth examining one of the reservations that Singapore listed in its EIA with 
Australia, which was signed and entered to force in 2003, because it brings into the spotlight the 
discourse between competition and stability in financial services: 
Singapore reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure in the form of subsidies or grants 
provided by Singapore in connection with the supply of any financial service involving what 
Singapore deems as systemically important financial markets infrastructure, including: (a) 
                                                     
21 For a great narrative of the unfolding of the crisis, see Lewis, Michael. The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine. WW 
Norton & Company, 2015 
22 For an analysis of the EU/US financial regimes see Yadav, Y., & Turing, D. (2016). The Extraterritorial Regulation of 
Clearinghouses. Journal of Financial Regulation, 2(1), 21-55. For the interaction between financial regulation and WTO 
law, see George A. Papaconstantinou, The GATS and Financial Regulation: Time to Clear-house?, (forthcoming in 2019). 
23 See, for example, contributions in economics and law literature addressing the intense relation between financial stability 
and competition, Vives, Xavier. "Competition and stability in banking: The role of Regulation and Competition Policy", 
Princeton University Press, 2016 De Meester, Bart. Liberalization of Trade in Banking Services: An International and 
European Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2014, respectively. 
24 For example the U.S. Intercontinental group (ICE) started operating a clearing house in Europe in 2014, see Philip Stafford, 
2014 https://www.ft.com/content/09a08298-c3f6-11e3-870b-00144feabdc0. 
25 However, it should be clarified that even if liberalization, in the sense of international trade flows, does not pose any perils 
to financial systems, problems could potentially arise due to the way industries evolve and the way regulatory frameworks 
adapt (or they don’t). Examples pertinent to clearing are the absence both in the U.S. and in the EU of resolution 
mechanisms of central counterparties (also called derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs) in the other side of the water). 
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Exchanges; (b) Central Depositories; (c) Repositories; (d) Clearing and Settlement facilities; and (e) 
Market operators. 
This national treatment and market access reservation circumscribes possible subsidies measures 
destined to systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). The reservation thereto seems to be 
prophetic in a number of ways. At first, it captures what happened in the banking sectors of Europe and 
the US, as a response to the 2008 crisis vicious cycle when banks had to be rescued with public money 
(taxpayers’ contributions). These regulatory options are not prima facie consistent with the rules of 
international economic law and domestic EU competition law,26 and thus, this reservation explicitly 
provides for the necessary latitude to Singaporean authorities. Furthermore, it resonates the systemic 
importance of financial market infrastructure, something that today more than ever is true for the 
functioning of clearinghouses and their international trade-flows. 
In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, no WTO law litigation arose with regards to the States’ support 
to the banking industry. Nevertheless, one may wonder to what degree did these bailout practices, both 
in the EU and the U.S., distort competition in relevant markets, encourage good practices, and promote 
national champions. The discussion over banks’ bailouts exceeds the scope of this study, but it suffices 
to say that the reasons that lead to this course of action involved the consideration of market failures of 
international financial institutions could result in negative externalities for domestic financial systems, 
in addition to their prominence in buying and holding sovereign debt. In the same vein, what is special 
about Singapore’s reservation is that it caters for a treaty provision in a trade agreement that reflects on 
the considerations of the financial industry and the state itself, while the majority of WTO Members 
when concluding trade agreements tend to overlook financial services’ intricacies. In particular, this 
reservation does not solely rely on the existence of the prudential carve-out for rainy days, but rather 
represents a well-thought expression of domestic protection from outside judicial scrutiny in the case of 
turmoil in financial market infrastructure. Thus, Singapore in this reservation sets a good precedent on 
meaningful considerations of financial services included in Economic Integration Agreements, 
regardless the possible anticompetitive effects of such provision. 
Not surprisingly, it is impossible to foresee all the potential competition and stability evolutions of 
the financial services industry. Nonetheless states should at least strive for explaining and 
communicating to their trade delegations all the issues of relevance for international trade and 
accordingly support them in the challenging task of liberalizing these markets through international 
agreements. Therefore, the Singaporean reservation at issue, although potentially trade-restrictive, 
constitutes a great example of interaction between the trade and finance teams of its government and 
attempts to strike a fair balance between competition and stability in an international trade agreement. 
3. EIAs not regulating trade in securities’ clearing and settlement services and international 
finance 
The rationale of the forthcoming analysis is to elucidate which are the EIAs that do not promulgate (i) 
the liberalization of financial services, and (ii) explore the underlying reasons behind. To address this 
question a review of the EIAs legal texts, and political economy considerations is required. The clearing 
and settlement of securities is a part of the broader realm of financial services, and that is why this study 
is necessary before we delve into their specific commitments undertaken for this services sector. In 
terms of sheer numbers, out of the 152 preferential trade agreements notified to the WTO, as of 24th 
May 2018, 37 either do not capture trade in financial services at all, or even if they do, their commitments 
are set out in abstracto, either in the form of future rounds of negotiations or in vague or weak 
commitments that do not even rise to the WTO threshold. This exercise can serve as a useful guide to 
                                                     
26 For a contribution that examines the role of injecting capital into the banking sector of the EU and the law of the WTO, see 
B. De Meester, “The Global Financial Crisis and Government Support for Banks: What Role for the Gats?,” Journal of 
International Economic Law 13, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 27–63. 
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shed light on the parts of the world that do not seem to be eager proponents of financial services 
integration, and to provide for the explanations why, while illuminating on some observed patterns on 
the basis of the collected data. Additionally, trade agreements are not only about the promotion of 
economic interests, but also political considerations and zones of influence play a major role in their 
conclusion. First, Table 3 records the 37 EIAs that are observed not to be financial services liberalization 
proponents with the legal justification traced in the content of these trade treaties, and then an analysis 
that underscores and elaborates on the most important aspects is deployed. 
Table 3: EIAs excluding financial services  
EIA 
Entry 
into force 
Provisions that exclude financial services from the scope of the 
EIA 
Canada - Chile 05-Jul-97 
Pursuant to Art. G-01 (2) and H-01 (2) (a) the Agreement does not 
cover trade in financial services for neither investment purposes nor 
cross-border supply, respectively. 
Chile - China 01-Aug-10 
Pursuant to Art. 2 (a) of the Supplementary Agreement on Trade in 
Services, financial services are not covered by the scope of the Free 
Trade Agreement between Chile and China. 
Chile - 
Colombia 08-May 
Pursuant to Art. 9.1 (4) and 10.1 (4) (a) the Agreement does not 
cover financial services for neither investment nor cross-border 
supply, respectively. 
Chile - Costa 
Rica 15-Feb-02 
Pursuant to Art. 11.02 (3) (d) the Agreement, financial services are 
not covered by the scope of the Free Trade Agreement. 
Chile - El 
Salvador  01-Jun-02 
Pursuant to Art. 11.02 (3) (d) the Agreement, financial services are 
not covered by the scope of the Free Trade Agreement. 
Chile - 
Guatemala 23-Mar-10 
Pursuant to Art. 11.02 (3) (d) the Agreement, financial services are 
not covered by the scope of the Free Trade Agreement. 
Chile - 
Honduras 19-Jul-08 
Pursuant to Art. 11.02 (3) (d) the Agreement, financial services are 
not covered by the scope of the Free Trade Agreement. 
Chile - Mexico 01-Aug-99 
Pursuant to Art. 9-02 (3) and 10-02 (3) (a) the Agreement does not 
cover financial services for neither investment nor cross-border 
supply, respectively. 
Chile - 
Nicaragua 19-Oct 
Pursuant to Art. 11.02 (3) (d) the Agreement, financial services are 
not covered by the scope of the Free Trade Agreement. 
China - Costa 
Rica 01-Aug-11 
Pursuant to Art. 91 (3) (e) the Agreement does not cover financial 
services. 
China- Hong 
Kong, China 29-Jun-03 
This Closer Economic Partnership although regulates financial 
services is not comprehensive and its trade disciplines are not fully-
developed. When it comes to MA it is absent from the Agreement 
text and it is not implicitly existent in neither commercial presence 
(only NT & MFN) nor cross-border supply which is 3 lines about 
further liberalization discussions. 
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China - 
Macao, China 13-Oct-03 
This Closer Economic Partnership although regulates financial 
services is not comprehensive and its trade disciplines are not fully-
developed. When it comes to MA it is absent from the Agreement 
text and it is not implicitly existent in neither commercial presence 
(only NT & MFN) nor cross-border supply which is 3 lines about 
further liberalization discussions.  
Colombia - 
Mexico 01-Jan-95 
The Parties according to Art. 12-15 they shall submit their 
reservations to FS sectors. Has not happened last time I checked 
15.II.2018.  
Colombia - 
Northern 
Triangle (El 
Salvador, 
Guatemala, 
Honduras) 12-Nov-09 
Pursuant to Art. 12.2 (5) and 13.2 (4) (a) the Agreement does not 
cover financial services for neither investment nor cross-border 
supply, respectively. 
Costa Rica - 
Peru 01-Jun-13 
Pursuant to Art. 12.1 (8) and 13.1 (8) the Agreement does not cover 
financial services for neither investment nor cross-border supply, 
respectively. 
Costa Rica - 
Singapore 01-Jul-13 
Pursuant to Art. 11 (3) and 10.2 (7) the Agreement does not cover 
financial services for neither investment nor cross-border supply, 
respectively. 
EFTA- Chile 01-Dec-04 
Pursuant to Art. 45 the Agreement, no commitments have been 
undertaken by the Parties in relation to trade in financial services. 
El Salvador - 
Honduras - 
Chinese Taipei 01-Mar-08 
Pursuant to Art. 10.02 (2) (a) and 11.02 (3) (d) the Agreement does 
not cover financial services for neither investment nor cross-border 
supply, respectively. 
EU - Albania 01-Apr-09 
Financial services are covered by the scope of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement to the extent that progressive liberalization 
between the Parties shall occur in the coming years. MFN treatment 
is only explicitly extended for mode (3) of trade in services. There 
are no concrete MA and NT commitments, and that is reaffirmed by 
the absence of Schedules.  
EU - Bosnia 
Herzegovina 01-Jun-15 
Financial services are covered by the scope of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement to the extent that progressive liberalization 
between the Parties shall occur in the coming years. MFN treatment 
is only explicitly extended for mode (3) of trade in services. There 
are no concrete MA and NT commitments, and that is reaffirmed by 
the absence of Schedules. 
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EU - 
Montenegro 
01-May-
10 
Financial services are covered by the scope of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement to the extent that progressive liberalization 
between the Parties shall occur in the coming years. MFN treatment 
is only explicitly extended for mode (3) of trade in services. There 
are no concrete MA and NT commitments, and that is reaffirmed by 
the absence of Schedules. 
EU - Serbia 01-Sep-13 
Financial services are covered by the scope of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement to the extent that progressive liberalization 
between the Parties shall occur in the coming years. MFN treatment 
is only explicitly extended for mode (3) of trade in services. There 
are no concrete MA and NT commitments, and that is reaffirmed by 
the absence of Schedules. 
EU - FYROM 01-Apr-04 
Financial services are covered by the scope of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement to the extent that progressive liberalization 
between the Parties shall occur in the coming years. MFN treatment 
is only explicitly extended for mode (3) of trade in services. There 
are no concrete MA and NT commitments, and that is reaffirmed by 
the absence of Schedules. 
Guatemala - 
Chinese Taipei 01-Jul-06 
Pursuant to Art. 10.02 (2) (a) and 11.02 (3) (d) the Agreement does 
not cover financial services for neither investment nor cross-border 
supply, respectively. 
Korea, 
Republic of - 
Colombia 15-Jul-16 
Pursuant to Art. 8.1 (4) and 9.1 (4) (a) the Agreement does not cover 
trade in financial services for neither investment purposes nor cross-
border supply, respectively. 
Korea, 
Republic of - 
Chile 01-Apr-04 
Pursuant to Art. 10.2 (3) (a) and 11.2 (3) (a) the Agreement does not 
cover trade in financial services for neither investment purposes nor 
cross-border supply, respectively. 
Korea, 
Republic of - 
New Zealand 20-Dec-15 
Pursuant to Art. 10.3 (4) and 8.3 (3) (a) the Agreement does not 
cover trade in financial services for neither investment purposes nor 
cross-border supply, respectively. 
Mexico - 
Central 
America 01-Sep-12 
Pursuant to Art. 11.2 (3) (a) and 12.2 (2) (b) the Agreement does not 
cover trade in financial services for neither investment purposes nor 
cross-border supply, respectively. 
Mexico - 
Uruguay 15-Jul-04 
Pursuant to Art. 13-02 (4) and 10-02 (2) (a) the Agreement does not 
cover trade in financial services for neither investment purposes nor 
cross-border supply, respectively. 
Panama - 
Chile 07-Mar-08 
Pursuant to Art. 10.1 (3) (a) the Agreement does not cover financial 
services. 
Peru - Chile 01-Mar-09 
Pursuant to Art. 11.1 (4) (a) and 12.1 (3) (a) the Agreement does not 
cover trade in financial services for neither investment purposes nor 
cross-border supply, respectively. 
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Thailand - 
New Zealand 01-Jul-05 
Pursuant to Article 8.1 trade in services is not captured by the scope 
of the current Agreement. Services trade is regulated by ASEAN - 
Australia - NZ. 
Trans-Pacific 
Strategic 
Economic 
Partnership 
28-May-
06 
Pursuant to 12.3 (2) (a) the Agreement does not cover trade in 
financial services. 
GUAM  10-Dec-03 
Pursuant to Article 17 of the FTA, trade in services liberalization is 
in a primary stage, and accordingly no specific commitments on 
financial services have been entered. 
Iceland - Faroe 
Islands 01-Nov-06 
No commitments have been entered for financial services, and it is 
unclear from the Treaty text whether trade in services is covered at 
all. 
East African 
Community 
(EAC) 01-Jul-10 
Neither in the Treaty for the establishment of the East African 
Community, nor in the Protocol for the establishment of the EAC 
Common Market, commitments for financial services have been 
entered, but rather proclamations for regulatory cooperation are set 
out. 
Dominican 
Republic - 
Central 
America 04-Oct-01 
Although trade and investment in financial services is covered by the 
content of the FTA, no country has undertaken any commitments 
pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, and following the wording 
of Article 10.15 future liberalization shall be awaited. Due to 
CAFTA-DR agreement and the role of the US this liberalization has 
been achieved in the context of another agreement.  
Source: Own analysis, WTO RTA database 
The content of the Table above illustrates which are the EIAs that do not regulate trade in financial 
services. To start with, the common denominator among these regional trade agreements is that their 
participating countries, on average seem to be financial services net importers, rather than exporters. 
This means that since their financial industries do not have the capacity to export, and as a result generate 
revenues through trade in financial services, the inclusion of financial services chapters or commitments 
is hardly of any relevance to them. On the contrary, it can only hinder the course of the EIA negotiations. 
To substantiate this claim it suffices to show in the table that the vast majority of the parties to these 
EIAs are Latin American and Caribbean countries which, with the exception of Panama,27 are not 
interested in exporting financial services, because of the nature of their economies.28 
However, as demonstrated by Stephanou,29 trade in financial services liberalization in EIAs is highly 
contingent upon the bargaining power of the parties to the agreement. The three well-known categories 
                                                     
27 Panama is an off-shore financial hub which constitutes an important financial services exporter, especially given its size. 
28 Specific studies have devoted their attention in how Latin American and Caribbean Countries have liberalized their 
financial services sectors, and how they have proceeded with the conclusion of EIAs. See for example, Goncalves, Marilyne 
Pereira, and Constantinos Stephanou. "Financial services and trade agreements in Latin America and the Caribbean: an 
overview." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4181, April 2007; Marconini M. (May 2006), “Services in 
Regional Agreements between Latin American and developed countries”, CEPAL – Serie Comercio internacional. 
29 Supra pp. 16. 
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are, the so-called, “North-South” EIAs, which refer to the agreements that are concluded between 
developing and developed countries, the “South-South” EIAs, signed between developing countries, and 
the ones between developed countries characterized as “North-North”. Unsurprisingly, when it comes 
to the first category (North-South), due to the existing strong and asymmetric bargaining power between 
the concluding parties, it is observed that the liberalization of financial services is in the top of the 
agenda.30 Contrary to that, the second category (South-South), although it is of vital importance for the 
growth and development of the contracting states, does not seem to be concerned about capturing 
financial services, or liberalizing them. This pattern is predominantly evidenced in this study, and the 
content of Table 3. Namely, 21 EIAs between developing countries do not cover the trade in financial 
services, and Latin and Caribbean countries are the main participants.31 
Consequently, it is held that when developing countries conclude trade agreements with one another 
they do not necessarily include of financial services, for the reason that it is not an area of special interest 
to their economies. The inclusion of financial services’ sectors to their trade agreement does not 
contribute to their growth, while the negotiating costs would surge. It is efficient from their perspective 
to leave them out of their EIAs. Nonetheless, when developing states negotiate EIAs with “North” states, 
then they are leveraged into the inclusion of financial services in the agreements. That comes as a natural 
consequence, since bigger and economically robust countries are more prone to exert pressure and 
achieve their goals in the conclusion of EIAs. As a result, the same “South” states when they conclude 
EIAs with “North” states, not only they include financial services in their agreements, but they tend to 
offer higher commitments than the ones entered in their GATS schedule. The analysis that follows 
examines the “depth” of the undertaken clearing and settlement services commitments in EIAs. Before 
bringing our attention to this topic, it is intriguing to succinctly underline another trend observed in the 
absence of firm commitments on financial services in EIAs. 
The analysis so far examines trade agreements as contracts that reflect the rational economic behavior 
of the participating states. This approach represents the general norm, but the existence of additional 
means and rationales that are not solely economic and according to which EIAs are designed and 
implemented should not be disregarded. An example of an alternative course of action is the European 
Union in the EIAs concluded with Western Balkans; namely, Albania, Montenegro, FYROM (Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.32 These agreements regulate 
both trade in goods and in services, including financial services, but their primary goal is not to liberalize 
financial markets of Western Balkans and accrue the associated benefit of free trade, but to stabilize the 
region and encourage its economic growth. 
Another facet of international trade is pertinent to establishing relations between states and promoting 
their peace and prosperity. The EU through these agreements does exactly that, and meanwhile it extends 
its geopolitical influence to the territories of the Western Balkans’ contracting countries. These 
Stabilization and Association Agreements are not comprehensive in terms of the commitments inscribed 
for the liberalization of financial services, but that is exactly because that is not the reason behind the 
conclusion of these treaties. By signing these treaties the European Union seeks to distribute the benefits 
of trade to these states, in order for them to grow economically, while being transacting with European 
                                                     
30 This has been observed in literature, especially with regard to the EIAs that the United States and the European Union have 
concluded, and it is brought into the spotlight empirically in the context of clearing and settlement commitments, in 
subsection 5.  
31 The “South-South” EIAs that do not cover trade in financial services are the following: Chile-Colombia, Chile-Costa Rica, 
Chile-El Salvador, Chile-Guatemala, Chile-Honduras, Chile-Mexico, Chile-Nicaragua, Colombia-Mexico, Colombia-El 
Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras, Costa Rica-Peru, El Salvador-Chinese Taipei, Guatemala-Chinese Taipei, Mexico-Central 
America, Panama-Chile, Peru-Chile, GUAM, Iceland-Faroe Islands, Dominican Republic-Central America, East African 
Community (EAC), and Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership. 
32 These agreements fall under the Stabilization and Association Agreements that the EU concludes in order to promote peace, 
freedom, stability, and economic prosperity through trade to the region. For more information, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/western-balkans/. 
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Union Member States. The next subsection starts addressing how commitments on financial securities’ 
clearing and settlement services are entered in regional trade agreements. Next, the “depth” of these 
commitments is investigated, using the ones undertaken under the GATS as the benchmark. 
4. Clearing and Settlement Commitments in EIAs: The countries that lead the way and the playbook 
of international dynamics for financial services 
i) Aggregate number of clearing and settlement commitments in EIAs 
We first investigate the mere number of clearing and settlement commitments that have been entered 
and received by WTO Members in the context of the unravelling effects of the exponential spike of 
regionalism. At the outset, this study illustrates the intentions of EIA parties to further integrate this 
particular financial services sectors with their trading partners. The countries that are financial services 
net exporters, as shown in Figure 1, are the ones that strive for higher levels of trade in financial services 
liberalization, through the preferential trade agreements they conclude. As a result, their trade policy 
agenda is oriented around the premise of acquiring commitments to that end. By receiving market access 
(MA), and national treatment (NT) commitments by their EIA partners, the principal challenges, in the 
form of qualitative and discretionary barriers to trade, that their suppliers can encounter in providing 
financial services in the respective markets are limited.  
Next, after having set out the primary information collected in terms of clearing and settlement 
commitments,33 a more detailed analysis proceeds which factors in the specific level of liberalization 
observed in EIAs, using as benchmark the GATS state of affairs at the multilateral trading field. 
Additionally, the international dynamics are put into context through a network analysis, whereby the 
countries with higher leverage are able to steer the behavior of smaller countries into opening their 
financial services markets to international competition. Geographical and chronological observations 
comes into play later on. First, Figure 1 below depicts in an aggregate fashion the number of 
commitments for securities’ clearing and settlement services that parties to EIAs have entered for their 
trading partners, and accordingly, have received from them. 
                                                     
33 Clearing and settlement commitments for the purpose of this figure amount to at least either a national treatment or a market 
access commitment of a party to an EIA for one of the 3 modes of supply (cross-border supply, consumption abroad, and 
commercial presence) that constitute the scope of this study. 
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Figure 1: Aggregate Clearing and Settlement Commitments in EIAs  
 
Source: Own analysis and computations based on WTO RTA database
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Figure 1 reveals that the countries that are the major financial services net exporters, such as the 
Members of the European Union, the United States, Singapore, Switzerland and Hong Kong among 
others,34 are the ones that have the tendency (i) to provide for commitments in clearing and settlement 
services, since they have already very advanced financial industries, and they are not afraid of foreign 
competition, and accordingly, (ii) to receive commitments on this service sector from their EIA partners. 
The US financial industry has been traditionally “offensive” in acquiring access to its trading partners 
jurisdiction, while having the bargaining power to leverage its own terms in trade agreements.35 As the 
figure shows, the United States comes first in the aggregate number of EIA commitments, having 
undertaken and received 19 commitments, followed by the European Union, having entered 17 
commitments on clearing and settlement services, while having received 15. Panama, Singapore, and 
Australia are also high on the list. The analysis that follows in sub-section ii, investigates the specific 
commitments and their intrinsic characteristics.36  
To embark on explaining figure 1, the observations have to be examined in parallel with the mere 
fact that economically robust countries and big regional powers, as the US and the European Union, 
respectively, have concluded the highest number of preferential trade agreements. Thus, since they have 
been members to numerous EIAs, it is not striking that these developed economies have acquired a high 
number of commitments on securities’ clearing and settlement services. However, it should be 
highlighted that out of the 152 EIAs on services, only 100 comprise commitments on clearing and 
settlement services. Consequently, the fact that these countries have participated in many EIAs is a 
crucial indicator, but it is not self-evident that their trading partners shall liberalize their financial 
services sectors. At the same time it should not be disregarded that the parties to EIAs cannot be forced 
to enter commitments on financial services in their EIAs, but rather trade negotiations tend to play a tit 
for tat game. 
To gain a better understanding on the reasons why WTO Members and parties to EIAs negotiate and 
conclude international trade agreements it is imperative to realize what triggers them to be in the 
negotiating table in the first place. One of the dominant answers is their belief in the benefits of free 
trade. Free trade, for starters, urges economic actors to seek and exploit their comparative advantage.37 
Subsequently, free trade opens markets and incentivizes firms to be more productive and innovative in 
order to acquire a better share of the expanded pie; this comes with more competition in the international 
                                                     
34 The data of International Trade Center (ITC) on exports of financial services, computed on the basis of the balance of 
payments (BOPs), portray that the countries that were the principal financial services exporters for 2016 were the United 
States (approx. 97 billion USD), the United Kingdom (approx.. 71 billion USD), Luxembourg (approx. 55 billion USD), 
Germany, Switzerland, Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, Ireland, France, Canada, India, China and Australia among others. 
For detailed data on the imports and exports of financial services see 
https://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelService_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|||||||S07|1|3|1|2|2|1|2|1|.  
35 For a narrative of the liberalization of financial services and the role of the industry, see Wagner C. (Winter 1999), “The 
New WTO Agreement on Financial Services and Chapter 14 of NAFTA: Has Free Trade in Banking Finally Arrived?”, 
NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas. 
36 Since commitments can differ significantly from one another, infra the analysis specifically examines the type of 
commitments that have been undertaken in the realm of preferential trade agreements, and in specific measures their legal 
trade-liberalizing traits. 
37 The theory of the comparative advantage was conceptualized for the first time in the beginning of the nineteenth century 
by a British political economist, see Ricardo, David. Principles of political economy and taxation. G. Bell, 1891. More 
recently the traditional economic approach to trade agreements has been criticized due to its unrealistic hypothesis on 
governments’ national welfare maximization. For the modern account , so called political-economy approach, that factors 
in the distributional consequences of trade policies, including rent-seeking, see Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 
1999. An economic theory of GATT. American Economic Review 89: 215-48; Baldwin, Richard. 1985. The Political 
Economy of U.S. Import Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press; Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger, 2001. Reciprocity, non-
discrimination and preferential trade agreements in the multilateral trading system. European Journal of Political Economy 
17: 281-325. Cf for a comprehensive account of the economic theories behind trade see Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. 
Staiger, 2002, The Economics of the World Trading System, MIT Press, pp. 13-42. 
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level. In addition, to these economic rationales it is also free trade that grants peace and prosperity to 
the nations that play by its rules, as the European Union experiment has proven since the end of World 
War II. These general benefits of free trade happen to materialize in tangible commitments when it 
comes to trade in services agreements, either in the context of the WTO or preferential trade 
agreements.38  
The general principle is that since countries care to boost their economic growth they are prone to 
negotiate trade agreements that are suitable for allowing them to export the goods or services sectors 
that they have a comparative advantage on. For countries to acquire market access to the sectors they 
wish, they have to offer for something in return. Most of the times they have to provide for favorable 
treatment to the contracting parties’ areas of interest. For a EIA hypothetical, assuming that country X 
has a very strong financial services industry, that represents 13% of its GDP, while country Y’s economy 
is largely based on tourism, a win-win deal would be for the countries X and Y to negotiate a trade 
agreement that would open the financial services market of Y to the service providers of X, and at the 
same time would incentivize tourism trade-flows towards Y. On that premise trade negotiations are 
carried out, but in some occasions it is not only rationale economic thinking that dictates the terms of 
negotiations, but also the influence that big countries exert over smaller ones. 
That has traditionally been the case for trade in financial services, since the first time they were 
regulated internationally under the GATS. The US financial industry lobbied for that in order to increase 
its share of the pie, and WTO Members followed up for their own reasons. For the purposes of this 
paper, it is essential to realize who are the main players in the international financial services arena, in 
order to develop a comprehensive analysis of the clearing and settlement services in EIAs in the first 
place, and to proceed by assessing how these countries conclude their EIAs, and under which terms and 
conditions. By now, it is clear that it is the European Union and the United States that internationally 
pull the strings for financial liberalization,39 and it is this study’s mission to witness how this trend is 
effectuated in the context of the financial service in question in EIAs. Accordingly, the analysis proceeds 
by measuring the “depth” of liberalization on clearing and settlement services in EIAs, and furthermore, 
scrutinizes the state of play of the EIAs that the United States and the European Union have concluded. 
ii) Measuring the depth of clearing and settlement commitments in EIAs 
The objective of this sub-section is to elucidate on the depth of the undertaken commitments on financial 
securities’ clearing and settlement services in regional trade agreements, and at the same time investigate 
the driving factors and relevant parameters that are of importance in that endeavor. At the outset, this 
study denotes, as described in Section II, the level of liberalization on the basis of the status quo of WTO 
Members at the multilateral trading system, namely WTO Members’ GATS commitments. Specifically, 
(i) GATS, once the level of liberalization is the same as in the Members’ GATS schedule, (ii) GATS 
plus, once the Member provides for commitments in addition to its GATS schedule, and (iii) GATS 
                                                     
38 For a contribution that captures the intricacies and particularities of services trade and its negotiations see Bernard Hoekman 
and Aaditya Mattoo, Services trade and growth, pp. 21-58, and Juan A. Marchetti and Martin Roy, Services liberalization 
in the WTO and in PTAs, pp. 61-112 in Marchetti, Juan A., and Martin Roy, eds. Opening Markets for Trade in Services: 
Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO Negotiations. Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
39 The difference between financial liberalization and the liberalization of financial services lies in the fact that the first 
constitutes the broader category that the second is a subset of. On the one hand, financial liberalization refers to the 
elimination of distortions in domestic financial systems which impede the efficient allocation of capital and the functioning 
of competition. On the other, the liberalization of financial services, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, pertains to 
the elimination of quantitative restrictions in the access of foreign financial services suppliers, in the form of the principle 
of market access, and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment, through the national treatment principle. For literature 
on financial liberalization see for example, Kaminsky G. and Schmukler S. (February 2003), “Short Run Pain, Long Run 
Gain: The Effects of Financial Liberalization”, IMF Working Paper; Claessens S. and Jansen M. eds. (2000), The 
Internationalization of Financial Services: Issues and Lessons for Developing Countries, The World Bank and WTO; 
Johnston B. (July 1998), “Sequencing Capital Account Liberalizations and Financial Sector Reform”, IMF Paper on Policy 
Analysis and Assessment 98/8. 
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extra, once the Member enters commitments for clearing and settlement services for the first time in 
EIAs. Categories (ii) and (iii) are together compounded as GATS+, for the sake of simplicity as the 
analysis of this empirical study unfolds. As a first step, figure 2 sets out the whole aggregate clearing 
and settlement services commitments in EIAs, which are 226 in total, charted in the y axe of time. This 
chronological illustration underscores whether the depth of liberalization (either at the same level as in 
the WTO “GATS” or going beyond “GATS+”) evolves. The value of this graph lies in offering a holistic 
perspective of the way commitments in this financial services sector are entered in international trade 
and investment agreements over time. 
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Figure 2: Level of Liberalization of Clearing & Settlement Commitments in EIAs over time 
 
 
Source: Own analysis and computations based on WTO RTA database 
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To interpret this figure accurately, it is imperative to understand first that out of the total number of 
commitments entered in EIAs for clearing and settlement services, half of them have adopted the GATS 
standard, whereas the other half has exceeded the GATS threshold.40 What can also be discerned by the 
bars of the graph is that although in general there is an equilibrium between the GATS and the GATS+ 
commitments over the years, in 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2016 higher level of liberalization for clearing 
and settlement services has been effectuated in EIAs. It is extremely difficult to distinguish the 
determinants that drive these EIAs’ GATS+ commitments, but the analysis proceeds by tracing the route 
these commitments follow, in order to reveal which countries open their clearing and settlement markets 
at first, and to whom through the conclusion of the economic integration agreements as a second 
consideration. 
Subsequently, the empirical analysis focuses on the GATS+ commitments on financial securities’ 
clearing and settlement services in international trade treaties. By exclusively examining this set of 
commitments it is easier to discern the factors that result in furthering the liberalization of financial 
services. To that end, the EIAs that liberalize clearing & settlement services beyond the GATS threshold 
are put into the microscope, Figures 3 and 4 set out the route that these commitments follow, and 
ultimately, their intrinsic characteristics are investigated below. Pursuing the objective of delineating 
which are the contributing factors in the liberalization of clearing and settlement services, Figures 3 and 
4 underscore which are the countries that enter GATS+ commitments in EIAs, and which are the states 
that reap the benefits of this liberalization, respectively.  
  
                                                     
40 To be precise, computations based on the WTO RTA database reveal that 54,42%, till the 23rd of May 2018, have used 
their GATS level of liberalization for financial securities’ clearing and settlement services, whereas 45,58 have opted for 
deeper liberalization in the services sector in question. Should be reiterated that the figures here represent the commitments 
that provide for this services liberalization in EIAs, and not the ones that don’t (“Unbound” for example), although this 
lack of commitment would represent the same level of liberalization as the one inscribed in some countries GATS 
schedules. 
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Figure 3: WTO Members entering GATS+ Clearing and Settlement Commitments in EIAs 
 
 
Figure 4: WTO Members receiving GATS+ Clearing and Settlement Commitments in EIAs 
 
 
Source: Own analysis and computations based on WTO RTA database 
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Figures 3 and 4 are very intuitive because they demonstrate the state of play of the liberalization of 
clearing and settlement services in EIAs. Essentially these two graphs show how GATS+ commitments 
on the services in question are distributed in EIAs. They explicitly underscore which countries are the 
net contributors, and which are the net beneficiaries. The results speak for themselves, but here we will 
try to contextualize these liberalization features, in order to make some sense out of this. The analysis 
first touches on the issues pertinent to the WTO Members that liberalize their financial services, in 
addition to the GATS status quo.  
To understand what goes beyond the GATS it is essential to understand first that the legal architecture 
of trade in services at the WTO is inherently asymmetric. This comes as the result of the political 
compromise that WTO Members stroke during the Uruguay Round in order to incorporate the regulation 
of trade in services in the text of the Marrakesh Agreements.41 Trade in services, unlike trade in goods 
which is easier to engage in for developing economies, requires high expertise and is not inclusive in 
terms of the capacities that states and their industries have to achieve growth through its mechanics. By 
default advanced economies have a comparative advantage in trading services. To compensate for that 
and for the developing states to be persuaded in a consensus at the multilateral trading system, the 
provisions under the title “Commitments” had to be introduced. These commitments allow to WTO 
Members to provide for (progressive) liberalization to their services sectors, through market access and 
national treatment principally, as they please. Consequently, referring to the GATS asymmetric 
architecture means that each WTO Member has defined its own depth of liberalization in its GATS 
Schedule of commitments, and as a result there is no homogeneity. This context is furnished to 
accentuate that not all countries share the same starting point in liberalizing their services’ sectors in the 
GATS, and financial services are not an exception to the rule.  
When it comes to EIAs, the same principle applies with the difference that the liberalization attained 
under these agreements does not extend to all WTO Members, but only to the ones that are parties to 
the specific preferential trade agreement, which is in accordance with the GATS Article V.42 The 
rationale of this provision is to encourage further liberalization of services, even this integration extends 
its benefits only to parts of the WTO system, assuming the conditions of the GATS Article V are 
fulfilled. For the purposes of this study, shall be stated that the existence of the GATS immense 
discretion in scheduling commitments has produced divergences in the liberalization of services among 
WTO Members. As a result, some countries have way more ground to cover to reach the levels of other 
countries. Additionally, financial services is a sector that traditionally protectionist policies are attached 
to, and clearing and settlement services do not deviate from this pattern. 
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of WTO Members that go deeper than their GATS commitments 
on securities’ clearing and settlement services while concluding EIAs are developing states, such as 
Panama, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica etc. This can partially be explained by the fact, that these 
states have lots of room to cover to liberalize their financial market infrastructure to the levels of 
developed WTO Members. This divergence on the liberalization of financial services can be easily 
exemplified by taking a look at the 20 states that have adopted the Understanding on the Commitments 
on Financial Services in contrast to the remaining WTO Members. In addition to that, some developed 
states as well opt for further opening their clearing markets, such as Japan, Australia, and Korea. To 
fully capture the dynamics that drive these states to the underlying policy decisions in EIAs, it is essential 
to investigate graphs 3 and 4 in tandem, in order to see which are the countries that are on the other side 
of the table, and accordingly, potentially reap the benefits of such liberalization effects. 
Figure 4 very clearly illustrates that it is the European Union and the United States that secure better 
liberalization conditions for clearing and settlement services through the conclusion of EIAs, in terms 
                                                     
41 See Mavroidis & Marchetti above note 11. 
42 GATS Article V, under the title “Economic Integration”, provides for the legal basis on which regional trade agreements 
on services are concluded.  
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of market access and national treatment commitments. This is a ramification of their asymmetric 
bargaining power and strong interest in exporting financial services. As a result, their EIAs reflect these 
two contributing factors, and this is bluntly portrayed in the GATS+ commitments the EU and the US 
receive for the financial services sector in question. The next subsection explicitly oversees which are 
the WTO Members that offer these GATS+ commitments to the EU and the US to complete the picture 
of the regulation of international financial instruments’ clearing and settlement trade flows. 
iii) The roadmap of GATS+ clearing and settlement commitments for the EU and the US in EIAs 
This subsection underlines which are the countries that offer GATS+ commitments to the EU and the 
US through the regional trade agreements they have concluded. As figures 5 and 6 show, the countries 
that inscribe GATS+ commitments in their schedules of commitments or lists of reservations with the 
US and the EU are highly similar with Latin American and Caribbean countries being the common 
denominator for the EIAs that both states have concluded. 
Figure 5: EIAs with the EU 
 
Figure 6: EIAs with the US 
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These graphs show how securities’ clearing and settlement services are regulated and liberalized in 
EIAs. Nonetheless, the liberalization of financial services is not only contingent on commitments 
undertaken under either the WTO or regional trade agreements, but most importantly it is dependent on 
the regulation of financial services by WTO Members. In a perfect universe, trade furnishes the norms 
and principles, such as non-discrimination and transparency, on the basis of which regulatory standards 
are constructed, assuming that market access and national treatment commitments have been inscribed 
for particular services sectors. Allowances must be made that trade sets out the general liberalizing 
patterns for services sectors, but it is the regulation of these sectors that prescribes the details and the 
specific conditions that domestic and foreign service providers have to comply with to ply their services. 
Thus, the trade of financial services is such a delicate field of law because the regulation of the services 
in question has to be calibrated with the international commitments of states under the GATS and other 
regional trade agreements. The next section ventures into an examination of the general patterns of the 
regulation of clearinghouses in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, and serves as a 
utility to compass around the interaction between financial regulatory standards and regionalism. 
IV. Financial Market Infrastructure Regulation and the States’ silos in negotiating EIAs 
This section aims to illustrate how the regulation of clearing services after 2010 has imminently changed 
the industry and has provided for the international standard on the basis of which the international 
clearing flows are effectuated, and to reveal that EIAs that have been concluded after 2010 do not seem 
to either mirror or adapt their scope to the twists and turns that industry has followed. Yet, international 
trade law and financial regulation are disparate legal disciplines, with different mechanics and points of 
reference. However, since they both prescribe legal norms for the regulation of the financial services’ 
sector in question, one would reasonably expect that synergies exist between the two legal orders in 
order to promulgate a coherent set of rules, rather than having two systems that do not interconnect at 
all. The analysis underscores an absence of coordination between the trade and finance teams of WTO 
Members’ administration, and wonders to what degree this deficiency can be mitigated. 
In response to the G20 accord, States started heavily regulating the clearing of OTC derivatives 
around the world. Prudential regulations of clearinghouses seek to mitigate the risks associated to the 
trading of derivatives that can have a seismic impact from a financial stability perspective. To that end, 
financial rulebooks around the world have been very comprehensive in regulating the industry and all 
its specific characteristics. One of the aspects of these regulatory standards pertains to how 
clearinghouses from foreign jurisdictions can provide their services in domestic markets, to domestic 
entities or even having a substantial effect on them. These set of rules that permit foreign clearinghouses 
market access fall in general under the category of regulation called “third-country equivalence” or 
“substituted compliance” in the EU and the US, respectively.43 Therefore, for foreign clearinghouses to 
offer their services in other jurisdictions the key is to comply with the abovementioned regimes. 
Nonetheless, the regulation of international trade either under the WTO or under preferential trade 
agreements provides for its own set of rules for financial services, either in the form of market access or 
national treatment commitments, or in the form of recognition provisions. Due to the intricacies of 
financial regulation and the existing silo between trade and finance administrations, trade delegations at 
the WTO and the EIA negotiating teams do not seem to take account of the challenges ahead relevant 
to the regulation of financial market infrastructure. This claim is substantiated by the fact that the 
regulatory change on the role of clearinghouses globally is not reflected in anyway in the content of 
EIAs. To buttress this view it suffices to say that when a financial sector is subjected to major shifts of 
that scale, as the case of clearinghouses, which heavily impact on the terms-of-trade, it is only for 
international economic law to react accordingly in order to adjust to new realities. Therefore, by closely 
                                                     
43 For an analysis of the European regulatory framework and the examination of its consistency under WTO law see George 
A. Papaconstantinou, note 21. 
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following the evolution of financial services, international economic law should utilize its toolkit so that 
not only it keeps up with the financial industry’s progress, but also facilitates the integration of these 
services through encouraging international trade-flows. Nevertheless, this approach does not side with 
reality. 
The drastic swift on the regulation of the financial industry described above is not captured by 
regionalism. Namely, neither the lists of reservations nor the schedules of commitments of the parties 
to EIAs, concluded after 2009, keep track with the changes. Alternatively, EIA parties by just inscribing 
next to the clearing and settlement category of their commitments that the supply of the services at issue 
hinges on specific provisions of their financial rulebooks, that translate the substituted compliance/third-
country equivalence frameworks, would have made a difference because at least the content of the trade 
agreement would provide for legal certainty with regards to the treatment of the financial sectors in 
question and would be consistent with the legal practices promulgated by states financial 
regulatory/supervisory authorities. However, this is emphatically not the case in EIAs, as evidenced by 
this study, and interestingly there is no mention of OTC derivatives as such in the content of preferential 
trade agreements in general, no matter their importance for many financial services sectors, and for 
securities’ clearing and settlement in concreto, which are vested with harnessing it. Thus, the absence 
of coordination evidenced in this study brings into the spotlight the existent silos in WTO Members’ 
administrations between finance and trade.  
An additional dimension that trade delegations seem to disregard relates to the fact that financial 
services industries develop rapidly due to either the impetus of technology,44 or the role of regulation in 
financial markets. Thus, it is imperative to device a mechanism in preferential trade agreements in order 
to revise the inscribed commitments or lists of reservations, on the basis of impact assessments that 
calibrate the existing legal texts to the new realities. Allowances should be made in respect of the specific 
means regarding the procedures of these revisions so that abusive practices are avoided. Such a scheme 
would be doubtful under the WTO, since negotiation rounds have stagnated for a long period. However, 
under EIAs one would expect that there is much room for improvement in that score because the parties 
to international trade agreements are more flexible and on average they are homogeneous. 
Ultimately, this contribution suggests that assuming that there were synergies between the trade and 
finance teams of WTO Members, the associated benefits for the trade of financial services would be 
huge. First, because financial rulebooks would have transparent standards that can only promote trade 
openness and liberalization. Second, because the content of EIAs would be better informed about 
reflecting financial services sectors legal state of play, and as a result ameliorate the plurilateral trading 
relations and deepening their markets. Third, because trade and financial regulation need to work in 
parallel in order to tame financial innovation and to achieve financial stability. 
V. Concluding Remarks  
This paper for the first time comprehensively evaluates in an empirical analysis the depth of 
liberalization attained in the plurilateral trading system for the financial services of securities’ clearing 
and settlement in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. This endeavor is driven by the need for 
examining the regulation of international trade and the one of financial services in parallel in order to 
attain legal certainty for the provision of the services in question, and to avoid situations under which 
the regulation of the one discipline does not capture the legal issues promulgated by the other, as it is 
the case argued by this study. 
                                                     
44 Technological progress tends to challenge the traditional forms of banking and finance and accordingly, change the 
financial industry as we know it. Innovations such as artificial intelligence or blockchain technologies nowadays spearhead 
the emergence of maverick companies and as a result many traditional financial services providers have started facing more 
competition. See for example Martin Arnold, Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/2f6f5ba4-dc97-11e6-86ac-
f253db7791c6. 
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The findings of this paper indicate that the integration of international financial market infrastructure 
services in economic integration agreements goes significantly beyond the threshold achieved in the 
WTO system by the GATS schedules of commitments. More importantly, it is observed that the 
beneficiaries of financial services liberalization traced in the clearing and settlement services of 
securities are principally the European Union and the United States. The main explanations for this trend 
put forward by this study are pertinent to the 2 States’ bargaining power alongside with their strong 
interest in opening third countries’ markets to their own financial service providers. 
Ultimately, we evaluate how the regulation of financial market infrastructure, and in particular the 
one on clearinghouses crafted after 2010 comes to grips with the way preferential trade agreements are 
structured and deal with the services in question. We find that the silos in WTO Members’ 
administrations between trade and finance teams are striking and that is substantiated by the mere fact 
that there is no indication in the content of EIAs that something has changed in terms of this financial 
services sector since 2009, even for the trade agreements concluded thereafter. This is problematic 
mainly for two reasons: first, because international trade law does not reflect and factor in the legal 
realities and regulatory standards, which represent the most important hurdles to services trade, which 
result in legal uncertainties; second, because both legal disciplines set out the rules for the operation of 
financial services it is quintessential to update EIAs in accordance with the mandates of financial 
regulation and not relying excessively on provision such as the prudential carve-out, so that further 
integration of financial services is attained. Finally, study argues that in order to remedy the mismatch 
between the evolving regulation of financial services and the static content of international economic 
agreements a frequent updating process of the agreements is required. 
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